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It is well known that social engineering attacks are 
designed to target the user-computer interface, rather 
than exploiting a systems technical vulnerability, to 
enable attackers to deceive a user into performing an 
action that will breach a system’s information security. 
They are a pervasive and existential threat to computer 
systems, because on any system the user-computer 
interface is always vulnerable to abuse by authorised 
users, with or without their knowledge.  
Historically, social engineering exploitations in 
computer-systems were limited to traditional Internet 
communications such as email and website platforms. 
However, in the Internet of Things the threat landscape 
includes vehicles, industrial control systems and even 
smart home appliances. Add to this mix naive users and 
default passwords that are extremely weak and easily 
guessed and the threat becomes greater. As a result, 
the effects of a deception-based attack will now no be 
longer limited to cyberspace (stealing information, 
compromising a system, crashing a web service ... etc.), 
but can also result in physical impact, ranging from 
manufacturing plants being damaged, trains and tram 
signalling disrupted causing death and injury, water 
treatment plants discharging sewage to damage to a 
nuclear power plants, e.g. STUXNET.  
In December 2014 damage was caused to a German 
steel mill furnace when hackers used targeted phishing 
emails to capture user credentials in order to gain 
access to the back office and ultimately the production 
network with devastating consequences. Another 
example occurred when households in Ukraine suffered 
a blackout on 23rd December 2015 caused by an attack 
which brought down the power grid. Again, the 
attackers used phishing emails to trick users at the 
electricity company into clicking on an attachment in an 
email, purportedly from the Prime Minister of Ukraine. 
This is thought to be the first cyber-attack which 
brought down an entire power grid leaving 80,000 
homes without electricity.  
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The more effective such cyber-physical attacks prove, 
[1], the more the deception attack surface continues to 
grow. For example, in the near future, fake tire pressure 
alerts shown on a car’s dashboard or gas leakage 
warnings on a SMART heating system’s GUI may be 
used to achieve deception in a manner not too 
dissimilar to current scareware pop-up alerts 
experienced by today’s mobile and desktop users. In 
the extreme, attackers may even begin to target 
medical devices (such as pacemakers or mechanical 
syringes delivering insulin) via near field 
communications or wireless sensor networks, in an 
approach analogous to ransomware. This has already 
occurred through the IoT using conventional hacking 
techniques (SSH vulnerabilities and unpatched systems 
with default hardwired passwords) and is commonly 
known as a MEDIJACK attack. The major problem with 
these devices is that they remain unpatched 
throughout their life-time and at the moment this is 
also the situation within the IoT. In figure 1 an overview 
of current and future IoT user-to-system interfaces 
provide a snapshot of the potential social engineering 
threat space. 
Would your Fridge lie to you? 
 
Prior to the advent of the IoT, an email or instant 
message purporting to originate from your fridge would 
seem ludicrous. Nowadays, however, the concept does 
not seem so absurd. In fact, it is exactly this change in 
our expectations from the way we use technology and 
the increasing capabilities of system-to-system 
communication that poses the most risk. Today's users 
expect greater visibility and control over their 
environment; leading a proliferation of distributed 
interfaces attached to what were traditionally 
isolated systems, sharing new types of data across a 
cyber-physical boundary. The result, an augmented 
attack surface at the disposal of willing cyber criminals. 
Since IoT devices themselves may not always be directly 
exploited, instead it is the distributed functionality and 
associated behaviour integrated into new and existing  
 
 
 
Social Engineering in the Internet of Everything 
By Ryan Heartfield and Diane Gan 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
systems that can be targeted. For example, it would not 
be unreasonable to imagine an attacker crafting a 
spoofed instant message from a user’s fridge, reporting 
that the fridge is running low on milk and asking 
whether they would like to place an order; with the 
Amazon style “one-click” ordering button (which 
conveniently leads to a drive-by download). But how 
did the attacker know their fridge was empty? Well, in 
the IoT they simply sniffed seemingly unimportant, 
unencrypted sensor node data sent from their fridge to 
their home automation controller; which connects to 
the user over the Internet via their home broadband 
router. Here, the attacker has exploited platform 
functionality that interfaces with the IoT device, in this 
case a fridge, by manipulating the perceived behaviour 
of the system as opposed to the device itself. In 
practice, such an attack can lead to a conventional 
exploitation such as system compromise or theft of 
banking credentials. It is not a great leap to envision 
that your fridge could be held to ransom by 
ransomware. Pay up or your fridge won’t turn on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike phishing emails claiming to originate from 
financial institutions and banks (which have existed for 
nearly 30 years), users are not sensitive to malicious 
behaviour originating from home/city automation 
systems, smart devices or social media platforms 
providing access to e-health, emergency or public 
services. To a large extent, this is because the physical 
appearance of such systems do not require significant 
change to become compatible with the Internet of 
Things; normally it is only the data these platforms 
generate that is shared. Specifically, the IoT is 
enhancing data accessibility which is further 
augmenting the attack landscape for attackers seeking 
to develop convincing social engineering attacks.  
Consider an attacker that is able to passively capture 
data from a wireless sensor in a workplace bathroom, 
where the sensor reports when the automated lighting 
is activated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - The Internet of Everything: SMART devices, cars, homes, cities, people... 
Figure 2 - Attacking a SMART fridge through intercepting and injecting spoofed 
application messages 
Here the attacker then uses the employee 
bathroom data collected to profile users and send 
targeted phishing emails promoting cosmetic products, 
such as makeup or shaving discount voucher links at 
specific times during the day.  
 
Data leakage: No data is too BIG or 
SMALL 
 
Just as the Internet of Things expands the different 
types of user-interfaces that can be targeted by 
attackers, consequently, the different types of data 
(previously hidden from attackers) that can be acquired 
is also increased. It is well known that attackers are 
adept at gathering user data and utilising this 
information as a mechanism to target a user and to 
better design an attack specific to the user’s system or 
to improve the credibility of the deception techniques 
that are used. Nowadays, social networks are used by 
hackers to obtain personal data about a user, for 
example your children’s names, pet’s name, dates of 
birth, where you graduated, etc. By detecting and 
exploiting systems which are of high value and using 
your “pattern of life” data, cyber-criminals can develop 
effective deception mechanisms by manipulating 
information the user is has shared and is therefore is 
and very familiar with has little reason to repudiate. 
Data leakage is exacerbated when geolocation is turned 
on in IoT devices. For example, anyone can then 
determine the exact location where a Smart phone 
picture was taken, which can be a problem if this 
identifies your home and you have just tweeted that 
you are going away on holiday. Burglars use Twitter as 
well!  
Recent research by the C-SAFE team at the University of 
Greenwich has demonstrated the ease with which an 
individual can be profiled through their leaked personal 
data using only social networks (Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Instagram …etc.) [2]. A series of experiments 
were undertaken to determine how much information 
could be extracted about three subjects using only 
social networking sites. By utilising three freely 
available tools (Twitonomy, Streamd.in, Creepy) that 
harvest information from Twitter, the data revealed 
where the three subjects lived, worked, the route they 
took to work each day and in one case  
where their parents lived and even where and when 
another subject went to the gym. It was also possible to 
follow each of them through cyber space to other sites 
such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Foursquare and Instagram 
where information missing from their “profile” was 
quickly filled in. The experiment demonstrated how 
easy it is for cyber-criminals to gather personal data to 
construct social engineering attacks which an individual 
would find credible. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Example of cyber stalking experiment monitoring and geo-
locating Tweets from Twitter user, Twitter feed (top left, middle), 
Creep.py (bottom left, right), Streamd.In (top right) 
 
“SMART”er Attacks 
 
Social engineering attacks against IoT devices are by no 
means “hypothetical” and exploitations abusing 
functionality in SMART devices have already been 
observed in the wild. 
For example, over the period of December 2013 to
 January 2014, security provider Proofpoint identified a 
cyber-attack that was originating from the IoT, where 
three times a day, in bursts of 
100,000, malicious emails targeting businesses and 
individuals was sent out. In total, the global attack 
consisted of more than 750,000 malicious 
emails originating from over 100,000 everyday 
consumer gadgets, 25 percent of which originated from 
smart TVs, home routers, and even one fridge [3]. 
Crucially, the attack demonstrated that botnets are 
now IoT botnets, capable of recruiting almost any 
device with a network connection and messaging 
software.   
In the following two hypothetical social engineering 
attack scenarios, each attack is practically facilitated by 
the functionality provided in the IoT. 
 
Attack Case A: IoT Phishing in Smart Homes 
 
Smart homes are becoming more common as people 
connect up numerous devices and “things” within their 
home. All these IoT “things” and devices connect to a 
network, be it wireless or wired and eventually connect 
to a routing device. Individually they may not offer any 
obvious value to cybercriminals, however they can 
provide a user interface which an attacker can 
manipulate to execute a social engineering attack. The 
following attack considers a threat actor who has 
gained control of a brand of IoT Smart meter cloud-
based services platform; bundled with the product to 
deliver updates or new content. Here, the attack can 
either monitor (what may be) unencrypted 
communication between the cloud services and the 
smart meter and inject information into existing data 
flows, or potentially send direct messages to the meters 
if they have gained complete control over the cloud 
environment.  
In both examples the attack triggers a message to all the 
smart meters which is displayed when the heating 
sensor indicates that the users are home (e.g. it has 
been turned up/down): “Software Upgrade Required, 
Go to: www.heaterupgrades.com/smartupgrade”, Run 
the patch from a Windows computer on this network”. 
If the user complies then they have been phished. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Example of a smart meter phishing attack via 
compromised update and content services in the cloud 
 
 
 
 
Attack Case B: The Internet of Social Things 
 
Social networking and media is at the heart of the IoT, 
where it is no longer only people that share information 
with other people, but also “things” that are able to 
communicate with users or with other “things”. Think 
back to your fridge kindly advising that you are low on 
milk. Your car might even want to tell your Facebook 
friends that its carbon footprint is less than 4 other cars 
on the road this week (e.g. in-product advertising 
across social media). The following attack considers a 
threat actor scanning Twitter, looking for status posts 
that include meta-data from IoT picture frames. IoT 
picture frames often come bundled with an app that 
allows a user to automatically download and upload 
pictures to popular social media platforms. In this 
example, the attacker finds a tweet containing the 
meta-data, however it is a re-tweet from an open 
Twitter account following a particular user who owns 
the target picture frame. Next the attacker sends a 
direct tweet to the user (who’s account privacy settings 
were locked down), from a spoofed Twitter account 
pertaining to be the picture frame’s manufacturer. The 
tweet contains a shortened URL to a Twitter app that 
will allow the user to install video functionality on their 
picture frame for free. In reality the Twitter app gives 
the attacker’s account rights to download all the 
pictures from the users IoT picture frame, which they 
plan to use as ransomware data or to craft future 
phishing attacks. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Example of attacker exploiting Internet of Social Things 
contagion to deliver social engineering attack 
 
 
 
 Defence Recommendations 
 
Principally, in order to instil confidence and encourage 
uptake in smart technologies that underpin the Internet 
of Things and for them to be usable in the long-term, it 
is necessary for the security of these devices to be 
robust, scalable and above all practical. Here, four 
approaches to defence are explored. 
Generic Attack Classification 
Since deception-based attacks in the IoT can be 
launched in either cyber or physical space identifying 
the source of a deception attempt and the structure of 
a social engineering attack can be extremely 
challenging. For developers, the challenge of building 
an effective defence that addresses a range of 
deception vectors would appear insurmountable when 
one takes into consideration all of the different 
platforms that may been involved in an attack. It is 
more practical to employ a generic classification 
criterion to breakdown down attacks into 
parametrised, components parts. This approach can be 
used to reveal shared characteristics between attacks; 
which then aids the design of defences that address 
multiple threats sharing similar traits. Using the 
taxonomy proposed by Heartfield and Loukas [4] and 
summarised by each root category in Figure 6, the 
following recommendations can help developers 
capture the multiple variables involved in the 
construction, delivery and execution of a social 
engineering attack, by applying criteria that are 
independent of the attack vectors used. 
 
 
Figure 6 - A high level summary of taxonomic classification criteria 
for social engineering attacks in the Internet of Things 
 
 
Orchestration:  
Target Description [TD]: How is the target chosen? 
Determine an attack’s targeting parameters to define 
which user and/or system features a defence system 
should focus on. A targeted attack is likely to exploit a 
specific user’s attributes leaked by their IoT footprint 
(e.g. a toll payment spear phishing email based on the 
tweets mapped to the geolocation of their vehicle) as 
part of the deception. Whereas promiscuous targeting 
is opportunistic and random (e.g. an attacker plants a 
malicious QR code in a shopping centre).  
Method of Distribution [MD]: How does the attack 
reach the target? Investigate the method in which the 
attack’s deception is distributed and where it is 
executed to identify the platforms that are involved in 
the attack. Whether it is a remote (hence involving a 
network) or local system that requires monitoring and 
defending. 
Mode of Automation [MA]: Is the attack automated? 
Recognising whether an attack is automatically or 
manually executed will help determine the most 
suitable response mechanism or the type of data that 
can be meaningful to collect about it. It may be possible 
to fingerprint a fully automated attack based on 
patterns of previously observed behaviour, while a fully 
manual attack may need to focus on the attacker’s 
behaviour instead.  
Exploitation: 
Deception Vector [DV]: Is it looks or behaviour that 
deceive the user? A defence mechanism needs to 
pinpoint mechanisms by which an attacker can deceive 
the user into a false expectation by manipulating visual 
and/or system behaviour aspects of a system. Within 
the IoT, it is not just graphical user interfaces that can 
be abused, but the physical appearance or state of a 
sensor node in a home/work/city automation system as 
well (e.g. heating thermometer, heart beat monitor, 
vehicle speed, traffic lights ... etc.) 
Interface Manipulator [IM]: Is the platform used in the 
deception only (ab)used or also programmatically 
modified? Depending on the system involved in an 
attack, it may be impractical or impossible to patch 
directly (e.g. pacemaker, legacy actuator ..etc.). In order 
to reduce the scope of a defence, developers need to 
establish whether the deception vector in an attack 
occurs in code (e.g. embedded within the system or 
external), or if the attack abuses intended user space 
functionality built into the platform by design.  
 Execution: 
Execution Steps [ES]: Does the attack complete the 
deception in one step? Model the effect that a single 
user action can have on the integrity of a platform, as it 
may be necessary to build in extra user authentication 
steps to commit actions; especially in e-health services 
or industrial controls systems. An attack that relies on 
multiple user response steps may be detected earlier 
and more easily than a single-step attack, and before it 
completes by looking for traces of its initial steps. 
Attack Persistence [AP]: Does the deception persist? 
Persistent deception attempts can be modelled by a 
learning-based defence system to identify its pattern of 
behaviour in order to block it. At the same time, it may 
also have a higher chance of success against the target. 
One-off deception attempts are by definition more 
difficult to detect and may be missed by a defence that 
is only looking for patterns in system behaviour or if the 
pattern is as yet unknown, i.e. a zero-day vulnerability. 
S-SDLC 
It is important that IoT platform developers have a 
detailed understanding of how their system will 
interface with users, as well as how system 
functionality may affect the wider ecosystem in which 
the system is be deployed. The Secure Software 
Development Life cycle (S-SDLC) provides developers 
with a guideline framework for the design and 
implementation of system software by integrating 
security considerations systematically into the core 
requirements and design of the software’s architecture.  
 
 
 
Within the S-SDLC framework, see Figure 7, under each 
life cycle stage the following key concepts can aid the 
development of IoT platforms and functionality that are 
resistant to deception-based attacks. 
Requirements.  
Identify the attack surface for an IoT platform by clearly 
defining the intended functionality and its expected 
limitations. Document the system-to-system and 
system-to-user interfaces forming the overall system of 
interest (SoI) and identify how these communicate and 
effect interfaces within the wider SoI (e.g., the 
deployment environment).  
Design 
Develop threat models that run through different 
features of the platform’s design and WSoI interactions. 
Pinpoint weak spots in the user interface that can be 
abused, or vulnerabilities in data transfer and network 
communications that may allow attackers to inject 
malicious data, code or gather information about the 
user. 
Coding 
Employ static code analysis to determine whether the 
platforms programmatic features are deterministic to 
ensure spoofed or injected data does not force the 
platform to exhibit a deceptive behaviour towards the 
user. Similarly, evaluate user interface controls 
(whether graphical or physical e.g. a button) to identify 
whether these can be (ab)used through intended 
functionality. 
Testing 
Design and implement scenarios where different user 
behaviour is arbitrarily executed (e.g., fuzzing), in order 
to identify anomalous situations when the user 
interface or functionality can become part of a 
deception-based attack. In testing, developers should 
generate and execute random input parameters, 
physical and logical, against the IoT platform in an 
attempt to elicit unhandled or anomalous behaviour 
that may lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Release/Maintain 
Establish monitoring or reporting functionality within 
the platform deployment environment to help detect 
attacks that will facilitate continuous patching and 
security hardening of the specific platform and/or 
external platforms that have lower security features. 
Figure 7 - Key concepts in the S-SDLC lifecycle for developing 
resistance to deception-based attacks in the IoT 
 Attack classification and Defence 
By applying each taxonomy criteria against each of the 
two IoT attack cases, classification is used to employ S-
SDLC 6 principles that help suggest a single approach to 
defence that would prevent both attacks.  
Case A:  
TD. Promiscuously targets any user who owns the 
smart meter, by flooding connected devices with 
messages and commands (e.g., malicious updates) via 
the cloud. 
MA. Functions as an automated message sent from the 
cloud-based service. 
MD. Distributed to execute deception via local 
software on smart meter. 
DV. Deception is both cosmetic and behaviourally 
convincing as the user would expect communications 
from the cloud platform. 
IM. Injecting malicious messages through the cloud 
attack the programmatic interface of the smart meter 
by adjusting the internal code to display a deceptive 
message. 
ES. The user must exercise multiple steps in order for 
the deception to be successful, first step downloads the 
supposed patch, the second step then requires the user 
to install the patch. 
AP. The message’s particular deception is one-off as it 
is unlikely the attacker will reissue the same phishing 
message to preserve the attack’s integrity.  
Case B: 
TD. Promiscuously targets any user who owns an IoT 
picture frame with social media app functionality. 
MA. Functions as a manual operation by searching for 
tweets, then creates a custom twitter account and 
tweets once a target is found. 
MD. Distributed to execute deception via remote 
software on the Twitter platform. 
DV. Deception is behaviourally convincing as product 
suppliers often communicate with customers via social 
media, as to gain customer data analytics. It is unlikely 
the Twitter account is visually credible (e.g., there are 
little or no followers, and as the account is not official 
tweets are not authenticated (no blue tic!)). 
IM. Here the attacks simply (ab)uses the user interface 
functionality of the Twitter platform. 
 
ES. The deception completes in multiple steps, as the 
user must click on the URL and then add the malicious 
twitter app permissions to their account.  
AP. The messages particular deception is one-off as it is 
unlikely the attacker will reissue the same phishing 
message to preserve the attacks integrity. 
By applying the taxonomy classification to each attack 
case we establish that a number of similar traits are 
shared in the orchestration, exploitation and execution 
phases. Firstly, both attacks target users promiscuously, 
so it would appear the attacker is seeking to build the 
deception around a vulnerability in an IoT platform and 
its use case; rather than a specific user’s platform 
profile. Both attacks are behaviourally deceptive, 
irrespective of whether they are visually convincing or 
not, and both attacks are one-off in their deception, but 
require multiple user steps to complete the deception 
and exploitation. By identifying that both attacks focus 
on the IoT product behaviour, rather than the users, it 
is clear that the S-SDLC requirements and testing 
stages would play a pivotal role in helping to mitigate 
these attacks. Crucially, it is the system-to-system 
interfaces of each IoT platform and their interaction 
with the ecosystem’s wider system of interest (e.g. Case 
A: cloud-based services over the Internet, Case B: 
Twitter application add-ons) that needs addressing.  
Analysis of each of the IoT devices, their interface 
contracts between other IoT platforms/devices and the 
functionality they extend should be clearly defined and 
then evaluated against different user deployment 
scenarios. By doing so, developers can identify specific 
functionality supplied by the system which is vulnerable 
to manipulation. Here, the manipulation of features 
supplied by the IoT devices in each attack case could 
easily be highlighted by reviewing each interface 
contract, then conducting a robust test of its 
functionality in different user deployment scenarios. 
Since both attacks deceptions are one-off they may be 
hard to identify and prevent, therefore it is even more 
important to rationalise system interface requirements 
before providing the users with functionality that the 
developers are not able (or willing) to protect. Where 
each attack requires multiple user steps to complete, 
integration of further authentication mechanisms for 
more significant functionality requests between 
interfaces should be enforced and reviewed through 
testing. This approach can help to identify if extra 
security procedures should  
 
be enforced before a user commits a potentially 
compromising action (e.g. force a user to review a 
warning or confirm their identity through multi-factor 
authenticating). 
User Susceptibility Profiling 
In order to provide a robust defence against social 
engineering attacks, responsibility cannot solely be laid 
upon the shoulders of system developers or 
organisations providing access to a computer system, 
whether that is an IoT platform connected to the 
Internet, a local area network or near-field 
communications medium. On the contrary, the users of 
the system are just as important, if not relied upon even 
more to act and use the computer securely to ensure 
that their actions do not inadvertently result in 
information security compromise. Remember, there is 
no silver-bullet for protecting against human-error.  
However, identifying a key set of user attributes that 
can be measured can help to provide a basis for 
modelling which type(s) of user profile are more or less 
likely to be susceptible to a deception-based attack. 
Such attributes could be used to define features for 
predicting and estimating user susceptibility when 
using a specific platform or range of platforms. 
Crucially, access to a user susceptibility profile provides 
the basis to apply a threshold in which the probability 
of user susceptibility triggers security enforcing actions 
aimed to minimise and/or mitigate exploitation. 
Human as a Sensor (HaaS) 
The concept of the human as a sensor has been 
employed extensively and successfully for the detection 
of threats and adverse conditions in physical space, for 
example to report road traffic anomalies, detect 
unfolding emergencies and improve the situational 
awareness of first responders through social media 
[10]. In a similar manner, human sensing can be applied 
to detect and report threats in cyber space as well. In 
fact, as the IoT crosses the cyber-physical boundary, the 
ability for users to report suspected attacks, both cyber 
and physical, may help to detect attacks initiated in one 
space that results in an effect on the other. In this 
respect, it then becomes particularly important to be 
able to tell to what extent users can correctly detect 
deception-based security threats; leveraging the 
intelligence provided by users to augment IoT cyber 
situational awareness.  
 
 
Within a smart city, users are likely to be exposed to 
many different IoT interfaces such as advertising, 
multimedia and wireless multicast feeds in the local 
geographic area (e.g. local car park capacity, what’s on 
at the cinema, popular restaurants ...etc.). Should any 
of these interfaces be targeted by an attacker using 
social engineering, users become an important source 
of information if a deception attempt is identified. In 
this example, the user can open their HaaS tool within 
their smart phone to report any suspected attacks, 
which can then be directly fed to the Smart cities 
security monitoring system. Free car parking might 
even be an incentive for correctly reported attacks! 
Conclusion 
 
The IoT promises to synergize technology in new and 
innovative ways and in doing so presents major social, 
business and economic benefits for modern society. 
Equally, for cyber criminals, the IoT promises significant 
rewards if a social engineering attack is executed 
successfully, because hacking the user can provide 
access to all the “things” that they control. The more 
successful social engineering attacks against the IoT 
are, the more user confidence in the IoT's security is 
undermined, ultimately delaying its adoption and the 
realization of its potential benefits. 
Fundamentally, protecting the integrity of the IoT is a 
two-way street. System developers should ensure that 
they employ best practice frameworks for producing 
secure IoT platforms. The example provided here is the 
S-SDLC. However, the wider message for IoT platforms 
is that security should be treated as an enabler of 
system functionality and not be a cost based bolt-on or 
ignored completely. Equally, users are a crucial firewall 
in detecting social engineering threats in the IoT and it 
is important that they are empowered to report 
potential threats, especially as they will be familiar with 
their own environment and more sensitive to its 
anomalous behaviour. Of course, at the same time, it is 
helpful to be able to measure whether users will be 
deceived by social engineering attacks in an IoT 
ecosystem and therefore as part of security awareness 
it is crucial that the IoT is factored into training material.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, each of these approaches, as shown in Figure 8, 
provide complimentary tools that help provide a 
through life defence architecture against social 
engineering attacks in the IoT. To improve IoT security, 
system developers must empower user threat 
detection with a mechanism to report suspected 
attacks and review/analyze user reports to determine 
their credibility. If they decide an attack report is 
credible, they can then apply a generic classification to 
determine the key aspects of the attack and finally 
integrate these attack vectors as patch parameters 
within the platform 'release/maintain' phase of the S-
SDLC.  
As Bruce Schneier once said, “People don’t understand 
computers. Computers are magical boxes that do 
things. People believe what computers tell them.”  
Trust lies at the heart of securing the IoT against 
deception-based attacks, and thus in order to instill 
trust, it is device integrity that must be protected to 
prevent user compromise. 
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Figure 8 - A four phase approach to through life management of user interfaces in an Internet capable 
platform 
